[craigwatson]

the biggest problem in this case is when the captain comments to the PF “your climbing” and he comments ” you think im climbing? ok ill descend” he lowers the nose the speed climbs back up (if they had stayed with this they would have recovered) at which point the stall warning sounds again, which in my opinion completely confused the crew, as everything was operating in reverse to what they were expecting… nose down, speed increasing generates stall warning, nose up, speed decreasing silences the stall warning, all completley strange functions (granted they were type rated on airbus aircraft so they should have know of this, but in the heat of the moment i think they forgot about this feature of the stall warning being silenced below a certain speed ( this does not happen on boeing aircraft), the captain was heard on the CVR commenting “this isnt possible” when the stall warning sounded after the PF applied nose down and the speed started increasing again. they were clearly confused.

But as air france does not provide high altitude stall training or high altitude manual handling training ( which is quite a significant point, as the control inputs at altitude are much smaller to what is required at lower altitudes) which in my opinion is what started this all in the first place, over control causing the zoom climb to 38000, thereby creating the onset of the stall, and the failure of the crew to even understand that they were stalled.

[RichHI1]

Much appreciated. It is great to have truly informed posts in these forums.

[craigwatson]

thats another topic in itself, some crews do climb to high to fast and place themselves to close to the corner, instead of waiting longer, burning fuel thereby burning fuel and decreasing weight and then climbing to a higher level. there is a trade off between safety and economics, its cheaper to fly higher, but safer to have a margin.

Some airlines do the high altitude stall training differently and dont want you to give up altitude, so their training emphasizes increasing speed and tiny nose down ( still nose up, but say from 5 to 2 nose up) to keep height loss as small as possible.)

as to your second sentence, pilots would never raise the the nose in these circumstances, “I” think what happened was when the AP disconnected and the aircraft rolled right ( thereby starting a shallow dive) the PF corrected left and pitched up, but was too aggresive in his actions as he had never flown or even trained at high altitudes before, thats why the zoom climb from FL350 to FL380 at 7000 feet/min.

[LuganoPirate]

Pomerol, I agree with you. But from what I’ve been reading, and from Craigs informed comments about high altitude training, pilot error does seem to be a contributory factor. However, it’s rarely just one factor which brings an airliner down, and usually a whole set which together cause the disaster.

So we have pilot error, the weather was certainly a factor, but planes fly everyday through bad weather without crashing. AF must accept some responsibity if training was in any way inadequate, but what else?

My knowledge is limited to having a PPL years back, but certain things, like swimming you never forget. In saying the following I’m relying on Air Crash Investigation from Nat. Geo. TV, Airliner.net forums and discussion with current A340/330 pilot friends of mine. I’ve not seen anywhere in this report (which I confess to not having read personally, but relied on press comment) criticism of the pitot tubes which AF did not upgrade despite evidence they could lead to problems. I’ve also heard comments about the weather radar not being used to its full capability, thus “hiding” the big storm behind the smaller one.

Let’s also not forget that other airlines were flying the same route that night, minutes behind and in front of the AF flight, and they all safely flew to their destinations.

I still do not believe this report has covered all problems encountered that night, and till they do, there will be doubt and lessons not learnt that could contribute that bit more to safety.

[RichHI1]

Lugano I think we should also reference Craig’s point that the
warnings in Airbus equipment can be counter-intuitive and this could exacerbate the lack of high altitude stall training.
The BEA report also says that the PF tried repeatedly to recall the Captain when they hit problems as he was resting.
I read the BEA report on their website and there is reference to the Pitot tubes icing.

[LuganoPirate]

Rich, thanks for the emphasis on Craig’s points.

I did not read the report, just the press comment and it was all focused on “pilot error”. I’m glad the pitot tube was mentioned in the report but think it a shame the press (and pehaps the BEA) emphasis was on pilot error and not the equipment.

[RichHI1]

Only repeated Craig’s comments as I think that there are other factors than pilot skill and may be there could be room for a more logical warning rationale on Airbuses as in times of stress it appears to cause confusion and in this case could possibly have made a partial contribution to the fatal outcome (given Craig’s comments about possible overcorrection)..
I think the BEA report is factual to the extent it can be.
As it is Air France we should be grateful they are not trawling the Atlantic for a piece from a Continental Jet…

[Swissdiver]

It seems the French press is doing it’s job… They (serious papers not trash press) published the fact that 2 days before report publication a whole paragraph incriminating Airbus was removed… Outrageous and not credible, I said…

[RichHI1]

Indeed the French Pilots’ Union have stopped co-operating with the BEA investigators until they can explain the last minute deletion and suppression of areas in the report relating to the A330-200 Stall warnings systems and their contrbution to the crash.
The BEA say it was too early and needed more analysis and this justififed total removal from the initial findings.
Air France have also requested the European Aviation Safety Agency to look into the stall warnings on Airbus equipment and make any necessary recommendations to improve future safety of Airbus equipment.
I would not wish to speculate however it would not be difficult to raise questions about the relationship between EADS and BEA given the behaviour here and in previous examinations.

[CallMeIshmael]

The last words

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2023807/Air-France-pilots-words-plane-crashes-sea-I-dont-control.html

Dismisal of tag-along legal actions in US

http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/California/Insight/2011/08_-_August/Manufacturers_seek_dismissal_of_tag-along_Air_France_crash_cases/

[Why_use_a_silly_name?]

We must always believe everything we read in The Daily Mail

[watersz]

There have been air speed indicator failures leading to crashes before
i.e the peruvian flight

iId have like to know if this kind of emergency is dealt with in simulation execises and how survivable it was under simulation.
They must have aleast tried it since.

I also dont know why the captain didnt take command and occupy the pilots seat as soon as it was feasable and possible personally I dont think he would have been able to save it especialy at night

.

[RichHI1]

Referring back to prior posts:

Notorious Bad weather spot
Thales made Pitot tubes proved faulty leading to conflict in speed read outs
Captain was not on the flight deck
Air France did not conduct satisfactory High Altitude Stall Training and increased responsiveness of controls in these situations.
Airbus stall warnings can be very counter intuitive and contribute to crew confusion in emergencies.
Any one item can probably be overcome but putting them all together….
(wording correction cabin to flight deck )

[watersz]

Captain was in the cabin , thogh how long before impact ,i’m unsure

[Swissdiver]

Watched an interesting programme on French television regarding AF447. While it was mentioned that AF had to review their safety approach (something they are doing now seriously) after Concorde and AF447 crashes, it was also said that one of the issues were the Airbus philosophy of uncoupled joystick compared to normal (and still in use at Boeing) coupled wheels… This might have had some importance as the second pilot would have seen the first one doing something that was apparently wrong (pulling instead of pushing)!

[Author]

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