QF A380 engine explosion ex SIN

Back to Forum
Viewing 15 posts - 76 through 90 (of 93 total)

  • MarcusUK
    Participant

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnkIWEJ3e54

    Pam Ann, Australian Comedian, summed Qantas up over a year ago…seems she was right!

    Little tongue in cheek humour at these difficult times.


    watersz
    Participant

    some reports point to a mid engine tubine blade failure causing then a substantial oil leak resulting in a fire

    this does not detract from the separate oil leaks found in other planes engines

    but if true a failure of a new blade is puzzling


    MarcusUK
    Participant

    Another Qantas 747 flying to Argentina left Sydney this morning, but had to return back after smoke in the cockpit!

    There seems to be a very distinctive pattern of events in the last 3 years with Qantas…perhaps outsourcing their maintenance was not such a good idea…engineers here and Qantas crews have been raising the issue for a long time.

    Rolls Royce aside, there are too many serious incidents cropping up too often, regularly with Qantas…


    pomerol
    Participant

    pomerol
    Participant

    JohnPhelanAustralia

    A report by Airbus on the damage caused by the Uncontained Engine Failure of the QF A380.

    http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/11/18/349900/pictures-airbus-catalogues-a380-damage.html


    LindsayW
    Participant

    and an interesting article here:

    http://www.smh.com.au/business/many-unanswered-questions-20101119-1812k.html

    I had heard the following from pilot friends (showing the pictures I have would make even more sense):

    Latest news is that the debris from the turbine failure has damaged the mainspar of the A/C wing which will be a massive repair.

    Once is an isolated incident. Twice is not. Thrice (if you include the T-1000 test cell uncontained failure) is a trend, a systemic problem.

    The disk has separated into a classic hoop failure comprising 3 or more pieces. The piece in the photo measures at about 133 degrees using the planar radii at the rim extended to the center, well within experience for typical tri hub burst. Scribing circles shows little visual circumferential distortion of the rim or bore indicating rapid burst.
    The fracture surface at the right side of the picture indicates planar propagation from the rim to the bore with a transition to tensile overload near the bore.

    The fracture surface at the left edge of the picture indicates hoop overload at the bore and planar propagation at the rim. Due to the sudden change in direction of the fracture surface upper-web it is likely that this fracture surface is secondary and that the direction of this fracture is bore to rim. Both the planar fracture surfaces terminate or emanate at disk slot bottoms.

    The upper surface of the disk bore exhibits tensile overload where the bore tore away from the shaft.

    It seems that they have the primary fracture surface on this piece. This is extremely valuable. It is usual that the surface is heavily damaged or at least smeared at the origin. After visual and SEM analysis, which may be able to characterize the type and rate of propagation depending on surface condition, the fracture will be sectioned away from the surface allowing verification of material properties very near the origin. When this work is completed there will be only a small number of unknowns and other evidence will assist in narrowing the root cause tree.

    It will be possible quite quickly to design an effective control plan based on this evidence. This could range from soft time inspections, to fixed interval inspections, to a changed hard time LLP life limit, or combination. Such control plans will automatically attract ADs due to the nature of the failure consequence.

    Almost regardless of the actual root cause, subsequent corrective action will take longer just because of the cycle time to design, certify, manufacture and retrofit a change, if appropriate


    LindsayW
    Participant

    and this in from a QF Flight Captain who knows the crew aboard well):

    “Here are just SOME of the problems Richard had in Singapore last week aboard QF32…. I won’t bother mentioning the engine explosion!…. oops…mentioned the engine explosion, sorry…..

    Richard was in the left seat, FO in the right, SO in the 2nd obs seat (right rear, also with his own Radio Management Panel, so he probably did most of the coordination with the ground), Capt Dave Evans in the 1st obs seat (middle). He is a Check & Training Captain who was training Harry Wubbin to be one also. Harry was in the 3rd obs seat (left rear). All 5 guys were FLAT OUT, especially the FO who would have been processing complicated ‘ECAM’ messages and procedures that were seemingly never-ending!

    * massive fuel leak in the left mid fuel tank (the beast has 11 tanks, including in the horizontal stabiliser on the tail)

    * massive fuel leak in the left inner fuel tank

    * a hole on the flap canoe/fairing that you could fit your upper body through [there is a photo of this that I can’t post]

    * the aft gallery in the fuel system failed, preventing many fuel transfer functions

    * fuel jettison had problems due to the previous problem above

    * bloody great hole in the upper wing surface

    * partial failure of leading edge slats

    * partial failure of speed brakes/ground spoilers

    * shrapnel damage to the flaps

    * TOTAL loss of all hydraulic fluid in the Green System (A380 has 2 x 5,000 PSI systems, Green and Yellow)

    * manual extension of landing gear

    * loss of 1 generator and associated systems

    * loss of brake anti-skid system

    * unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using normal method after landing due to major damage to systems

    * unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using using the fire switch!!!!!!!! Therefore, no fire protection was available for that engine after the explosion in #2

    * ECAM warnings about major fuel imbalance because of fuel leaks on left side, that were UNABLE to be fixed with cross-feeding

    * fuel trapped in Trim Tank (in the tail). Therefore, possible major CofG out-of-balance condition for landing. Yikes!

    * and much more to come………. ”

    I heard there were 53 separate ECAM warnings. The crew performed magnificently, especially since it is only a new type in service with the crews not having a great deal of time on this type of aircraft.


    LindsayW
    Participant

    Just got some updated photo’s of the main spar. IMHO, VH-OQA will be a resident of Singapore for a long long time……Back to France on a boat, perhaps?

    Also, got some further information (from a 747 Captain):

    ” 1. Bus #2 is supposedly automatically powered by Bus #1 in the event of Engine #2 failure – didn’t happen.

    2. Buses #3 & #4 will supposedly power Bus #2 in the event that the auto transfer from Bus #1 fails – didn’t happen.

    3. After some time the RAT deployed for no apparent reason, locking out (as a load-shedding function) some still functioning services.

    4. One of the frequently recurring messages warned of the aircraft approaching the aft CoG limit (the procedure calls for transferring fuel forward), the next message advised of fwd transfer pumps being u/s. This sequence occurred repeatedly.

    5. Apparently landing/approach speeds are obtained from the FMS, but there weren’t anywhere near sufficient fields to load all the defects for speed corrections – the crew loaded what they thought were the most critical ones.

    6. The crew commenced an approach NOT because they’d sorted out all the problems but because they were very worried about the way-out-of-tolerance and steadily worsening lateral imbalance.

    7. The aircraft stopped with just over 100 metres or runway left, brakes temps climbed to 900C and fuel pouring out of the ruptured tank. Unable to shutdown #1 engine (as previously mentioned) but elected not to evacuate as the fire services were attending in great numbers.

    8. The other comment from the source of the above (who was on the flight deck) was that the aeroplane did many things they simply didn’t understand and/or failed to operate as expected.

    Possibly I’ve got some of the nomenclature wrong (being a Boeing man, and proud of it).

    Seems the aeroplane didn’t function very well, the crew did a fabulous job, made some difficult decisions correctly, but that it was far closer to catastrophe than the press realized.”


    wanula1
    Participant

    My understanding from various sources is that a new wing will be manufactured and shipped to Singapore for the refitting to the aircraft.

    However I can imagine there are a number of challenges to replacing an entire wing but that’s the current plan.


    watersz
    Participant

    well from reports now surfacing the phrase “a damn close run thing ”
    might springs to mind

    it would seem the muliple system failures caused such a work related capacity overload in the cockpit the plane was only saved because of the additional 2 pilots I assume dead heading on board


    JordanD
    Participant

    watersz: incorrect – the 2 additional pilots weren’t dead heading; rather the plane was lucky to have two very experienced extra hands on board. One was a “Check Pilot”, who was performing a ‘standard route check’ on the Captain, the other was a “Trainee Check Pilot” who was learning the drills to become a fully fledged Check Pilot.

    Both were (and are), from press reports, very experienced aviators.


    LindsayW
    Participant

    Early estimates of the cost of this month’s Qantas A380 engine fiasco exceed $100 million….
    http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/cost-of-qantas-a380-engine-drama-put-at-100m/story-e6frg8zx-1225963543296


    JohnPhelanAustralia
    Participant

    Manufacturing problem potential factor in QF32 engine failure

    The ATSB has issued a safety recommendation about potential engine problems in some Airbus A380 aircraft.

    The safety recommendation identifies a potential manufacturing defect with an oil tube connection to the high-pressure (HP)/intermediate-pressure (IP) bearing structure of the Trent 900 engine installed in some A380 aircraft.

    The problem relates to the potential for misaligned oil pipe counter-boring, which could lead to fatigue cracking, oil leakage and potential engine failure from an oil fire within the HP/IP bearing buffer space.

    In response to the recommendation Rolls Royce, affected airlines and safety regulators are taking action to ensure the continued safe operation of A380 aircraft. The action involves the close inspection of affected engines and the removal from service of any engine which displays the suspected counter-boring problem.


    LindsayW
    Participant

    Qantas begins legal action against the engine supplier Rolls-Royce following the explosion of an engine on one of the airline’s Airbus A380s….
    http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11895106


    JohnPhelanAustralia
    Participant

    The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released its preliminary report into the explosion on the QF A380 ex SIN.

    http://www.couriermail.com.au/travel/news/flight-cam-captures-a380-drama/story-e6freqwo-1225965266487

Viewing 15 posts - 76 through 90 (of 93 total)
You must be logged in to reply to this topic.
Business Traveller March 2024 edition
Business Traveller March 2024 edition
Be up-to-date
Magazine Subscription
To see our latest subscription offers for Business Traveller editions worldwide, click on the Subscribe & Save link below
Polls