[cwoodward]

In delving a little deeper into both Boeing and Airbus available information what is interesting is comparing the quality of the customers in their order books. It seems that the quality of Airbuses book is far superior to that of Boeing’s. By this I mean the likelihood of order cancellations due to the customers downsizing or inability to continue.

The below information from Airbus web sites.
April 2020

Airbus logged net orders in April for nine commercial aircraft from its A320 product line from Avolon.

By April 30th, Airbus’ gross orders in 2020 totalled 365 aircraft. After cancellations the net orders stand at 299 aircraft.

During the month, 14 deliveries were made from the A320, A330 and A350 XWB aircraft families.

Business in April brings the overall total orders logged by Airbus since its creation to 20,407 commercial aircraft, which includes 15,572 A320 Family aircraft, 1,819 A330s, 930 A350 XWBs, 642 A220s and 251 A380s.

In April, 12 A320neo Family aircraft were delivered. For Airbus widebody aircraft, one A350 XWBs was provided in the A350-900 configuration; along with one A330ceo.

Among the month’s notable deliveries was the first 100% e-deliveries to Pegasus Airlines.

Airbus’ backlog of aircraft remaining to be delivered as of 30th April stood at 7,645, comprised 6,217 A320 Family aircraft, 529 A220s, 322 A330s, 568 A350 XWBs and nine A380s.

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Johnnyg

[cwoodward]

An interesting piece from reuters.

https://www.reuters.com/article/aircraft-projects/planemakers-slow-plans-for-new-jets-as-they-focus-on-survival-idUSL5N2CF5PN

[tomwjsimpson]

Boeing job cuts start to hit 12,000 US workers

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52827377

[IanFromHKG]

Boeing resumes building the MAX: https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1528805-20200528.htm?spTabChangeable=0

[Johnnyg]

As Boeing announced the loss of a further 258 MAX orders in March and April,

I wonder how many of us thought when we did the ‘When will the MAX fly again’ poll that it would still be grounded 14 months later?

[ontherunhome]

With the current situation, I find this odd. making planbes that may never be used. I for one will avoid the Max, as and when I start flying again, so any airline using them will miss my custom. I dont like the 737 anyway, but will fly on the current models as they are relatively safe, compared to Max. They should bring back new 757 and 767 versions to do the job, and keep 737 as short haul.

[IanFromHKG]

More news as Boeing cuts over 12,000 jobs: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52827377

[cwoodward]

Announced yesterday
Boeing 777x delayed by at least a further year.
Deliveries now to start March 2022 and that is IF they can get the aircraft certified.

[cwoodward]

It looks as though undue pressure is being brought to bare on federal employees in Boeing’s and US governments efforts to have the aircraft recertified. I suspect at almost any cost. Not unexpected of course.

From AAP

“Federal employees overseeing Boeing and other aircraft makers say they face pressure from the companies and fear retribution from their own bosses if they raise too many safety concerns, according to a survey of the workers that was delivered to Congress on Friday.

Many of the Federal Aviation Administration employees surveyed said they believe that agency managers are too concerned with the industry’s objectives and aren’t held accountable for decisions about safety.

One FAA employee said companies will say they will lose money if the FAA doesn’t certify its plane fast enough. Another said the message to FAA workers is, “Don’t rock the boat with Boeing.”

The summary and comments were contained in a private company’s report, dated in February, on the safety culture at the FAA. The FAA faces scrutiny from Congress over its approval of the Boeing 737 Max, which remains grounded after two deadly crashes less than five months apart.

The report reflects “a disturbing pattern of senior officials at a Federal agency rolling over for industry,” said Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., chairman of the House Transportation Committee. “That’s especially disturbing to see when it comes to Boeing, which, as we know now, pushed a plane through a broken regulatory process that resulted in the deaths of 346 innocent people.”

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FAA Administrator Stephen Dickson said the report shows “that we have work to do to address problems” in the safety culture within the agency’s aviation safety organization. “It is completely unacceptable that there are employees who lack confidence that their safety concerns are taken seriously.”

Dickson promised changes including creating a program to encourage FAA employees to report safety concerns.

Dickson, a former Delta Air Lines pilot and executive who became FAA chief a year ago, was spared from the sharpest criticism in the survey. The report said employees perceive him to be demonstrating a commitment to safety. It cited a video in which Dickson pushed back against comments by Boeing officials that were seen as pressuring the FAA to let the Max resume flying.

The FAA asked Mitre Corp. to conduct the survey and report last year after the agency promised to improve its safety culture. Mitre said it sent surveys to more than 7,000 employees in the FAA’s aviation safety group and 25% responded.”

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GivingupBA

[Johnnyg]

Excerpts from todays report, from The Times.

A “culture of concealment” at Boeing and a desire to put profits before safety were among the failures that contributed to two fatal crashes of the 737 Max, a congressional report has concluded.

The crashes were “the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management and grossly insufficient oversight” by the Federal Aviation Administration, according to the report, which was published yesterday by the US House of Representatives’ transport committee.

The 238-page report was published at the end of an 18-month investigation into the design, development and certification of the Max. The committee hauled top brass from Boeing and the FAA to Capitol Hill for a series of fractious public hearings and examined 600,000 pages of documents.

The report says that Boeing withheld crucial safety information from regulators and pilots, including details about a new flight control system that contributed to the crashes. Under “tremendous financial pressure” to compete with the Airbus A320neo, Boeing made “extensive efforts to cut costs” in the Max programme and thereby “jeopardised the safety of the flying public”.

It suggests that Boeing and the FAA have not learnt from their mistakes.

A string of allegations have been made against Boeing since the crashes, causing significant damage to the reputation and finances of the world’s largest aviation group. Boeing, valued at close to $250 billion just before the Lion Air crash, is worth about $94 billion today, having also been hurt by a sharp drop in demand during the pandemic.

The report includes new detail about the safety culture at Boeing during the development of the Max. It said that senior managers appeared to ignore warnings from rank-and-file employees about a flight control system known as the manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system, or Mcas. Unique to the Max, Mcas was intended to counteract the effect of putting larger engines on the 737 airframe. If a sensor reading showed that the aircraft was pitching too far upwards and nearing a stall, Mcas instructed the tail stabiliser to apply nose-down force.

Internal communications at Boeing, found by the committee, showed that Boeing engineers had questioned the safety of the Mcas system because it was linked to only one sensor. They discussed the risk that a faulty sensor could activate Mcas, and how pilots might not be able to react in time.

In November 2012, Boeing engineers noted that one crew of test pilots had taken four seconds to respond to an Mcas failure, whereas another crew took more than ten seconds, and judged the episode to be “catastrophic”. However, as part of the Max certification submitted by Boeing to the FAA, Boeing said that pilots should be able to respond to an Mcas failure within four seconds. Boeing also failed to classify Mcas as a critical safety system, thereby avoiding closer scrutiny by the FAA, the report says.

Peter DeFazio, Democrat chairman of the committee, said that the findings were “disturbing”. “What’s particularly infuriating is how Boeing and [the] FAA both gambled with public safety in the critical time period between the two crashes,” he said.

Boeing said: “We have learnt many hard lessons from the accidents . . . and from the mistakes we have made.”

The FAA said it was “committed to continually advancing aviation safety” and was focused on “improving our organisation, processes and culture”.

[Inquisitive]

One can say Boeing and FAA did not do a good job during Max design and certification.
But what about chief Pilots of all large airlines? For any new design, aren’t some senior Pilots from a company will verify all aspects at the simulators?

MCAS was a completely new concept, I wonder why airlines and their senior Pilots didn’t raise the issue openly before the crash.

Even after first crash, many was trying to blame the pilots and the airlines as that was a smaller airline. Hindsight is always easy.

[IanFromHKG]

[quote quote=1011343]MCAS was a completely new concept, I wonder why airlines and their senior Pilots didn’t raise the issue openly before the crash.[/quote]

Because they didn’t know about it and/or how it worked? Remember it was deliberately omitted from the pilot training for the MAX.

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cwoodward

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