[CathayLoyalist2]

An incident that had some similarities with AF447 flying from Rio de Janerio to Paris on 1 June 2009, Air France flight AF011 from New York to Paris on 5 April carrying 192 passengers and crew was around 1,000ft from the ground on its final approach to Charles de Gaulle airport when the pilots ran into trouble and had to abort the landing.

Investigators from the BEA now say the issue was caused by the two pilots pulling their joysticks in opposite directions at the same time without realising, in what they deemed a ‘serious incident’ – industry jargon meaning it could have led to an accident.

On the AF447 crash,investigators found the pilots had lost control when air-speed sensors froze amongst other things. Are these two incidents pointing towards issues surrounding AF flight deck crew training?

[GivingupBA]

The magazine SIMPLE FLYING has a report on this from 2 days ago, with more details. The report it titled “French Investigators Release Update After Serious Air France 777 Incident”.

[cwoodward]

A clear case of the captain and the FO fighting to control the aircraft. All established safety protocols were totally ignored
Their behaviour caused the aircraft to be seconds from crashing.
Their unprofessionalism is inexcusable and they should in my opinion both be immediately dismissed and licences revoked.

Sequence

At 07:51:12, when the aeroplane was at an altitude of 1,115 ft, banked 7° to the left, with the wheel oriented 16° to the left, the crew carried out a go-around. Up until the go-around, the flight path had remained within the operator’s stabilization criteria. The recorded parameters show that the two pilots then simultaneously made inputs on the controls.

In the following second, the position of the wheel reached a maximum value of 27° to the left. One second later, the roll reached a maximum value of 15° to the left and the nose-up attitude was 12°.

At 07:51:16, the captain commented that the plane was going left. The control columns were then desynchronized8 for 14 seconds due to opposing forces. The captain held the control column in a slightly nose-down position while the co-pilot made several, more pronounced, nose-up inputs. Two brief episodes of wheel desynchronization were also observed.

At 07:51:20, the go-around switches were pushed again increasing the thrust to the maximum thrust available.

At 07:51:23, the pitch reached a maximum value of 24°.

At 07:51:25, the co-pilot called out “Positive climb” and retracted the landing gear. The configuration warning was displayed and the associated aural warning (siren) sounded. The two pilots continued to simultaneously make inputs on the controls. The captain made more pronounced nose down inputs for a few seconds.

At 07:52:06, the captain was the sole person making inputs. The crew completed the go-around actions.

The crew analysed the situation without perceiving the antagonistic inputs made on the controls and the desynchronizations of the control channels. They considered that they could use the AP again and carry out a new approach.

The co-pilot became the PF again. The captain informed the controller that there had been a problem on the flight controls and asked to join the final for runway 27R. The approach and landing took place without further incident.

The sustained input on the controls led to the PTT button and the AP disconnect switch being involuntarily pressed, the latter action causing several activations of the associated warning.

No failure warning was activated during the occurrence10. No anomaly was observed on the aeroplane.

At this stage, the analysis of the parameters does not show inconsistencies, in particular between the movements of the controls and the movements of the aeroplane. The validation and the analysis of the parameters are continuing. Particular attention will be given to reproducing the forces applied to the controls and to the relationship between these forces and the movements of the controls.

This is far from the first time that this sort of thing has happened with Air France in past years and with fatal results.
Until they sort out their pilot training I will not be flying with them.

As I recall Turkish had the same sort of behaviour problems a few years back which was the cause of several fatal accidents and in my opinion still to a degree persists.
A very long time ago now JAL had significant problems in the same vain that was also the cause of fatal ‘accidents’ As I recalled they very sensibly contracted Qantas to retrain the pilots and trainers and the problem was forever eradicated.

5 users thanked author for this post.

ASK1945, GivingupBA, Montysaurus, Jacob, Inquisitive

[Swissdiver]

This is why I prefer airplanes with yokes! At least a pilot can see what the other does. I hate those joysticks!

1 user thanked author for this post.

cwoodward

[DavidGrodentz]

From what I understand, the Boeing 777 doesn’t have a joystick, it has a yoke

[cwoodward]

Yes a yoke

[Swissdiver]

It was indeed a 777 (contrarily to AF447). I stand corrected. But then how come “Investigators from the BEA now say the issue was caused by the two pilots pulling their joysticks in opposite directions at the same time without realising” (first post)?

1 user thanked author for this post.

cwoodward

[esselle]

[postquote quote=1211472]

The “yoke” control has had the nickname “joystick” for years. The Airbus equivalent is actually known as a side stick.

2 users thanked author for this post.

Swissdiver, cwoodward

[Swissdiver]

So how come the pilots could not “realise” they were pulling it in opposite directions?

[Swissdiver]

Tis but a scratch!

3 users thanked author for this post.

Johnnyg, Montysaurus, cwoodward

[Author]

Posts